JUSTICE AT THE
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE LEVEL:
THE NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION
Alan B. Handler*
INTRODUCTION

Improving the performance of state intermediate appellate courts
has not particularly arrested the attention of court reformers. Judicial
reform for the most part has concentrated upon trial courts, overall
court structure, general aspects of court administration and certain
ancillary judicial concerns such as corrections and sentencing, probation and juvenile in-take, to mention just a few. In contrast, the work
and adequacy of appellate courts generally had been viewed with
tepid interest. Nevertheless, the problems affecting trial courts inevitably lap the shores of appeals courts and the resulting erosion in
the dispensation of justice at the intermediate appellate level has become palpable.
Gains in expedition achieved in trial are lost on appeal because
of the increasing delays now encountered by courts of intermediate or
last resort. Reforms, designed to improve the dispensation of justice
and to surmount the inordinate delays in disposing of litigation, frequently are cancelled out when the case goes up on appeal.
Moreover, slippage in judicial performance at the appeals stage of
litigation has a way of working itself back to the trial level. Inadequacies at the appellate level indirectly become embedded in trial
court attitudes and performance.
Reform of appellate courts has been sluggish. It seems that for
change to get underway there has to be a perception of crisis. More
importantly, the time must be right and recognition of the need for
reform must be shared by persons in a position to do something
about it. In New Jersey, efforts to improve appellate performance
have come slowly. Nevertheless, reform has started and a modest beginning has been made. 1
* Associate Justice, New Jersey Supreme Court.
1 The thrust of this article is to present the New Jersey experience with respect to current
reforms of its intermediate appellate court as they may relate generally to state intermediate
appellate courts. It is by no means an aside to mention at the outset that these reforms and
their resultant, initial success are very much a reflection of the attitude and concern on the part

of the New Jersey Supreme Court under the stewardship of Chief Justice Richard J. Hughes. It
is entirely fitting, therefore, that the accomplishments in this area of judicial reform be men-
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THE BACKGROUND FOR CHANGE

The imperative for change at the intermediate appellate level iii
the state was written in the arithmetic of appellate litigation. Statistics
left no escape from the conclusion that the justice system was foundering on the appellate as well as trial levels. One word can be said to
describe the sum: delay.
Unquestionably the major cause of the pervasive delays in the
justice system has been the litigation explosion, a phenomenon occasioned by a combination of demographics, economic activity, and a
sharpened public appetite for litigation. 2 This can readily be seen at
the appellate level in this state in the growth of appeals. For the five
year period, from 1973 through 1978, case filings in the state Appellate Division rose dramatically, from 3,801 in the 1973-1974 term to
5,306 in 1977-1978, a fort), percent increase. 3 Similar expansion occurred with respect to ancillary court business such as motions generated in the Appellate Division: 2,097 motions were filed in 1973-1974
compared to 4,593 five years later, 4 an increase of more than one
hundred percent.
One consequence of the litigation explosion might be said to be a
judicial and administrative implosion. Confronted with the massive
filings of appeals and motions, court clerks and supporting adninistrative staff have been less able to keep up with the volume and maintain adequate case management. Others participating in the appellate
process, trial judges, court reporters and lawyers, have also been
slowed by the sheer number of appeals. Delays encountered in the
filing of essential trial documents-transcripts, appendices and
briefs-have contributed to prolonging the time required to perfect
cases on appeal and have them read), for disposition by the court. Not
unexpectedly, the "ripple effect" has had its impact on the judges.
The appellate judges have encountered greater difficulties and personal hardship in coping with the volume of cases. Thus one untoward result of the litigation explosion within the court itself has been

tioned in tribute to the retirement of Chief Justice Hughes as well as that of Associate Justice
Worrall F. Mountain, whose contributions to the cause of justice are reflected not only in his
many excellent opinions but in his unstinting support of the judicial and professional reforms
sponsored by the Supreme Court.
2 National Center for State Courts, A Study of the New Jersey Appellate Division
Clerk's

Office 14, 103-13 (1979); National Center for State Courts, Appellate Courts: Staff and Process
in the Crisis of Volume 7-9 (1974).
I National Center for State Courts, A Study of the New Jersey Appellate Division Clerk's

Office, supra note 2, at 11-12, 104.
4 Id. at 49.
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that it now takes slightly more than one year after filing for an appeal
to be concluded. 5
These problems have not gone entirely unheeded. Delays in appellate justice have been the subject of frequent complaints and
commentary. The invariable solution throughout the years, for the
most part, has consisted of increasing the numerical size of the Appellate Division. Thus, when this court was created as part of the modern New Jersey court system with the adoption of the New Jersey
Constitution of 1947, it consisted, in its first term, of two three-judge
parts. It remained with a total of six judges for one more year and
was then increased by another three-judge part. Nine judges served
in the Appellate Division through 1960-1961.6 The appellate court
went to four three-judge parts in 1961-1962 and remained at that
level until 1970-1971. 7 Another, fifth part was added in that year
and the court continued at fifteen judges for the next three years
until 1973-1974 when it went to eighteen judges sitting in six parts.
One year later, in 1974-1975, the Appellate Division reached its current level of twenty-one judges organized into seven different parts. 8
While increasing the size of the court was designed to keep pace
with growing volume, the filing of appeals and the backlog of pending
undisposed cases did not diminish. Thus, when the court consisted of
two parts, filings increased from 673 to 814 and the backlog of undisposed cases went from 287 to 364. In 1961-1962, when the court
added a fourth part, the Appellate Division disposed of more appeals
than before and brought the backlog of cases down from 663 in the
prior term to 648. 9 Thereafter, however, the march of new filings
and the resultant backlog continued unabated, increasing from 1,115
and 762 in 1962-1963 to 2,449 and 2,185, respectively, in 1969-1970.
When the court went to five parts in 1970-1971, the growth continued from 2,749 and 2,521, respectively, to 3,801 and 3,725 in
1973-1974 at which time the court was increased to eighteen judges.
Since the court reached its present size of twenty-one judges in
1974-1975, new appeals rose from 4,383 to 5,305 in 1977-1978; the
backlogs of pending cases similarly flourished during the same period
of time, 4,210 to 6,193.10
5 1d. at 43-45.
6 For part of both the 1952-1953 and 1957-1958 terms, twelve judges sat.
7 In the two terms of 1963-1964 and 1964-1965 the Appellate Division dropped back to
three parts.
8 The figures are derived from the annual reports of the Administrative Director of the

Courts for each year and statistical summaries furnished directly by the Clerk of the Appellate
Division.
9 Id.
10 Id.
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It is true that during this period of time, when the size of the
Appellate Division was increased, the overall production of the court
improved at least in terms of total case dispositions. The efficiency of
the court system, however, measured in terms of case dispositions
per sitting judge did not narkedly improve. Thus, during the time
the Appellate Division increased in size from six to twenty-one
judges, the average number of cases disposed of by the Appellate
Division as a whole increased by a factor of approximately seven
times (6.7). The output of the court for each sitting judge, however,
increased only by a factor of 2.5. In large measure the increase in
total productivity was due not only to the fact that more judges were
added to the court but that judges individually were disposing of
more cases. Hence, the increase in productivity of the court as a
whole is accounted for by harder work on the part of individual
judges in terms of hours and workload; it is not a reflection of increased efficiency on the part of the court. This is illustrated by the
following chart" showing the numerical growth of the court and its
correlation to the total number of cases disposed of each term and by
each judge through opinions (as opposed to dismissals, withdrawals
and the like):

Term
1948-49
1949-50
1950-51
1951-52
1952-53
1953-54
1954-55
1955-56
1956-57
1957-58
1958-59
1959-60
1960-61
1961-62
1962-63

Total
Disposition
Dispositions by Opinion
386
644
781
683
850
781
699
767
711
730
705
851
925
1163
1001

389

410
409

498
600

Number
of
Judges

Total
Dispositions Opinions
per Judge per Judge

6
6
9
9
9(12)
9
9
9
9
12
9
9
9
12
12

" Id. Performance for the term 1978-79 is considered infra.

64.3
107.3
86.5
75.9
94.4
86.7
77.6
85.2
79.0
60.9
78.3
94.5
102.7
96.9
83.4

64.8

45.6
34.1

55.3
50.0
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Term
1963-64
1964-65
1965-66
1966-67
1967-68
1968-69
1969-70
1970-71
1971-72
1972-73
1973-74
1974-75
1975-76
1976-77
1977-78

Disposition
Total
Dispositions by Opinion
1061
986
1661
1449
1570
1660
1937
2410
3012
3461
3590
3898
4819
4249
4754

555

1228

2300
2448
2660
3143
3001
3032
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Total
Number
of
Dispositions Opinions
Judges per Judge per Judge
9
9
12
12
12
12
12
15
15
15
18
21
21
21
21

117.9
109.5
138.5
120.7
130.8
138.3
161.4
160.6
200.8
230.7
199.4
185.6
229.4
202.3
226.4

61.6

102.3

153.3
136.0
126.7
149.7
142.9
144.4

This graphic representation of the relationship between the increase in the size of the Appellate Division and the productivity of
that court readily yields the conclusion that increasing the number of
judges as a tool for judicial reform is a finite palliative. There was no
consistent reduction in the accumulated backlog of undecided appeals
at the end of each year; judges, on the basis of individual performance, did tend to dispose of more cases but hardly enough to increase the efficiency of the court as a whole. Nor was there any compression in the delays between the filing of an appeal and its final
disposition. Thus, increasing the size of the appellate court constitutes an inefficient and expensive technique for dealing with the large
growth of new appeals each year and is largely ineffective in terms of
surmounting the glut of undisposed cases left at the end of each court
term. It seems clear that as long as litigation continues to expand and
the growth in new appeals does not abate, adding judges cannot serve
both to increase judicial production and to achieve reasonable efficiency of judicial performance.
There was some perception of the limitations inherent in simply
increasing the size of the court. Other measures to improve the situation in the appellate court were also instituted or suggested. Judges
of the Appellate Division early in the 1970's, for example, were instructed for a time to dispense with the writing of opinions. Some
time later the judges were adjured to submit "per curiam" or un-
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signed opinions, to discourage "pride of authorship" and induce the
prompt filing of terse, economical opinions. A later change in the
New Jersey Court Rules authorized the submission of brief opinions,
in effect disposing of appropriate cases by order in an attempt to
economize judicial efforts. Rule 2 :11-(3)(e), adopted in 1975, provided for affirmances without opinion in civil appeals in cases in
which sufficient evidence is found to support findings of fact, jury
verdicts or administrative decisions. Such affirmances were also approved for both civil and criminal appeals in instances in which legal
12
issues raised are found to be without merit.
The plight of the Appellate Division was described in the editorial columns of the New Jersey Law Journal. It was recommended, at
least on an interim basis, that decisions in the Appellate Division be
rendered by a single judge with provision for three-judge dispositions
under certain circumstances. 1 3 A report on the status of the Appellate Division was submitted by the Appellate Practices Study Committee of the New Jersey State Bar Association, which recommended
(albeit as an alternative to increasing the size of the Appellate Division) dispositions of cases by less than three judges. 14 The use of
two-judge panels was explored by other commentators. 15 These and

12 New Jersey Court Rule 2:11-3(e) provides in full:
(e) Affirmance without Opinion:
(1) Civil Appeals. When in a civil appeal the Appellate Division determines
that any one or more of the following circumstances exists and is dispositive of a
matter submitted to the court for decision:

(A) that a judgment of a trial court is based on findings of fact which are
adequately supported by evidence;
(B) that the evidence in support of a jury verdict is not insufficient;
(C) that the determination of a trial court on a motion for a new trial does not
constitute a manifest denial of justice;
(D) that the decision of an administrative agency is supported by sufficient

credible evidence on the record as a whole;
(E) that all issues of law raised are clearly without merit and the court determines that an opinion would have no precedential value; then and in any such case

the judgment or order under appeal may be affirmed without opinion and by an
order quoting the applicable paragraph of this rule.
(2) Criminal Appeals. When in a criminal appeal the Appellate Division deter-

mines that some or all of the issues raised by the defendant are clearly without
merit, the court may affirm by an opinion which, as to such issues, specified them

and quotes this rule and paragraph.
N.J.R.2:11-3 (e).
13 What To Do About the Appellate Division Backlog, One Version, 99 N.J.L.J. 116 (Feb.
12, 1976).
"' Report of The Appellate Practices Study Committee of the New Jersey State Bar Association (unpublished 1976).
15 Botter, Two-Judge Appellate Panels, THE REPORTER XX (Nov. 1976).
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other techniques for enhancing the performance and productivity of
the Appellate Division were the subject of a report of Appellate Division judges submitted to the Supreme Court in June 1976 and discussed in the official publication of the State Bar Association.1 6 Many
other proposals were put forward such as summary dispositions in
appropriate cases, automatic dismissals of delinquent appeals, mandatory one-line opinions in simple affirmances, elimination of oral arguments, and the use of oral decisions in cases requiring argument,
as well as a streamlined motion practice; longer-range recommendations entailed restructuring the Appellate Division and limiting ap17
peals as of right.
Nothing discernible emerged from this rash of suggestions until
1978, when Chief Justice Hughes, with the approval of the Supreme
Court, designated a committee of the Court itself to undertake a review of the status and performance of the Appellate Division with a
view towards presenting to the Court recommendations for reforms
and improvements. Its report was submitted to the Court in July
1978.18
THE REFORM PROGRAM FOR THE
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

The July 1978 Report of the Supreme Court's Committee on the
Appellate Division was a relatively sparse document. It recounted the
nature of the crisis within the Appellate Divsion, noting the problems
of calendar congestion and delays or "lag time" in the disposition of
individual appeals despite the numerical increases in the size of the
Appellate Division. Among the matters mentioned were problems besetting the Office of the Clerk of the Appellate Division, delays in the
filing of transcripts and briefs, counterproductive "deficiency" practice
which served to slow. the perfection of appeals for disposition and
ineffective discipline of attorneys who failed to adhere to appellate
rules of practice and court directives. 19
The major proposals put forth by the Committee were: (1) a
thorough and professional study of the operation of the Office of the
Clerk of the Appellate Division; (2) the disposition of appeals in appropriate cases by two judges; (3) the summary disposition of suitable

16 Handler, Reforming the Appellate Division-Now, N.J.S.B.J. 30 (Feb. 1977).

17 See Supreme Court Committee on the Appellate Division, Report on Appellate Division
Reforms, 102 N.J.L.J. 41, 65 (July 20, 1978).
18 Id.
19 Id.
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cases; (4) the disposition of most motions by single judges; (5) the use
of letter briefs; (6) a more efficient procedure for the handling of deficient briefs and other filed papers; and (7) the development of stricter
and more consistent discipline of attorneys who offended appellate
rules. The Report suggested that other areas be reserved for further
consideration and recomendations at a later time. These included
study of the basic organization and structure of the Appellate Division, the possible limitation upon the unqualified right of appeal, the
utilization of supporting staff for legal research, and the subject of
appellate opinions and dispositions in general."0
The pivotal recommendation of the Supreme Court's Committee
was for the disposition of appeals in appropriate cases by two judges.
It observed that because of the unqualified right to appeal there were
a substantial number of cases amenable to final decision by two
judges. Such cases could be reasonably identified. They would be
those which were obviously uncomplicated, clear-cut, noncontroversial and relatively unimportant to the public. A final disposition by two judges of cases with these characteristics could be accepted with the same confidence as would their decision by three
judges. In making this recommendation, the Committee contemplated that in all cases judges would retain the discretion to
21
utilize a third judge in the disposition of the appeal.
This proposal, -after adoption by the Supreme Court, was incorporated in its Court Rules. The language of Rule 2:13-2(b), in pertinent part, states:
Appeals shall be decided by panels of 2 judges designated by the
presiding judge of the part except when the presiding judge in his
discretion determines that an appeal should be decided by a panel
of 3 judges. Such a determination may be made where the appeal
presents a question of public importance, of special difficulty, of
precedential value, or for such other special reason as the Presiding Judge shall determine. The panel of 2 judges to which an appeal is submitted for decision may elect to call the third judge to
participate in the decision at aiiy time before making its determination and shall do so if the 2 judges cannot agree as to the determination.

22

Another key proposal related to the procedures of the Clerk of
the Appellate Division with respect to the time-lags in readying filed

20

Id.

21 1(/.
22

N.J.R. 2.13-2(b).
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appeals for court submission. The Report noted that the Clerk's office
performs an invaluable service to the court by screening all appellate
papers and briefs for deficiencies and rejecting defective documents.
The system was designed to serve the convenience of the judges by
assuring the technical quality of the papers submitted to them. This
service by the Clerk, however, had become counterproductive, causing
substantial delays in the submission of cases to the court for adjudication. It was suggested, therefore, that the Clerk under the direction
of the court reduce the list of deficiencies justifying the rejection
of briefs or other filed papers but that, if deficiencies were sufficiently grave to require rejection, an automatic fine to cover costs
should be imposed as a condition for filing. 23 A corollary recommendation called for uniform, consistent and strict discipline by
judges of attorneys who violate rules of appellate practice without
reasonable excuse. These recommendations were ultimately im24
plemented by court directives.
The Supreme Court thus approved the adoption of the proposals
of its Committee and authorized their implementation for the next
Court term, effective September 1978.25
ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE REFORM PROPOSALS

There was relatively little exposition in the Committee Report of
the jurisprudential, traditional or historical assumptions which lay at
the heart of its particular proposals to improve the quality of justice at
the intermediate appellate court level. Nonetheless there appeared
more than a hint of its important value-judgments. The Committee
commented that "cognizance should be taken that the principal responsibilities of the Appellate Division as an intermediate appellate
court are: (1) to dispose of appeals justly and fairly and expeditiously;
and (2) to foster, develop and contribute to the law through its judicial decisions."26 In fashioning a program for reform, there was evident concern for the appropriate role to be fulfilled by the intermediate appellate court. The Committee had this to say:
Primary emphasis should be on measures which will ameliorate as

rapidly as possible the performance of the Appellate Division with
respect to the delays in deciding cases and the persistent backlog.
Initial reforms should therefore (1) accelerate the rate of the
23 Report on Appellate Division Reforms, supra note 17, at 41, 65.
24 See 102 N.J.L.J. 137-42 (Aug. 10, 1978).
25 Id.
26 Report on Appellate Division Reforms, supra note 17, at 41, 65.
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disposition of cases; the time within which an appealed case is decided must be compressed; and (2) they should also increase the
number or volume of appeals determined annually and thus reduce
effectively the backlog of pending cases. Other mediate solutions
should endeavor to consolidate efficiencies of performance and enhance the judicial achievements of the court in its singular role as
an intervening appellate court, but which so often becomes the
final court of appeals.
Of necessity all)' solutions ultimately adopted, whether immediate or long-range, should be complementar, and interrelated
so that the Appellate Division can properly fulfill its role and discharge its responsibilities as an intermediate appellate court in deciding cases justly and with reasonable dispatch while continuing to
27
contribute to the growth of law.
In its capacity as a reviewing tribunal, the Appellate Division
operates as a judicial fail-safe. It provides a means by' which the fallibility of the adversary system of litigation, with its attendant risk of
error, in some measure can be overcome. This-judicial reviewsquares with widespread and prevailing notions of what is needful for
the fair and adequate resolution of litigated disputes and the dispensation of justice. 28 Hence, as part of the dispute-resolving machinery
of a state judicial system, an intermediate court of review fails in its
responsibilities if it cannot conclude controversies before it without
ruinous delays and untoward costs.
The initial priority adopted by the Supreme Court's Committee
related to improving the performance of the court in this, perhaps its
most important function-to provide judicial review of individual
cases. 29 Obviously, to discharge this responsibility, an intermediate
appellate court must do its job efficiently and expeditiously. The mischief spawned by' delays in a justice system has been copiously recounted. It is, of course, illogical and indefensible to believe that
delays in the final and ultimate resolution of litigation encountered on
the appellate level are any less intolerable than those experienced in
the trial courts.
The role of the intermediate appellate court in furnishing judicial
confirmation or correction of individual litigated cases takes on added

27

Id.

2"

ABA Comm. on Standards of Judicial Administration,

STANDARDS RELATING TO APPEL-

(Approved Draft 1977) [hereinafter cited as ABA Standards]; Hopkins,
The Role of an Intermediate Appellate Court, 41 BROOKLYN L. REV. 459, 460-64 (1975); Hufstedler, New Blocks for Old Pyramids: Reshaping the Judicial System, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 901,
LATE COURTS §3.00, at 4

910-15 (1971).
29 See Report On Appellate Division Reforms, supra note 17, at 41, 65.
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importance in view of the fact that the intermediate appeals court is
in most cases the court of last resort. 30 This is undeniably the situation in this state. To take three court terms, for example, the Appellate Division by opinions and dismissals disposed of 4,333 cases in
1975-1976, 4,237 in 1976-1977 and 4,741 in 1977-1978. Cases coming
to the Supreme Court from the Appellate Division, both by appeals
as a matter of right and by certification for each term respectively,
were 190, 201 and 168. Thus, less than five percent of all the cases
matriculating through the intermediate appellate court were decided
eventually by the Supreme Court.31 Even if there were added to
this total, cases considered by the Supreme Court by wav of its review of petitions for certification (including those denied as well as
accepted), namely 705, 967 and 698 for each of these terms, the percentage of cases which wend their way to the Supreme Court is still
quite modest. 3 2 The empirical realization that the intermediate appellate court constitutes the final court in most litigated cases brings
greater significance to its role in reviewing and adjudicating the correctness of the results of the trial court in individual cases and is all
added reason for demanding efficiency and dispatch in the performance of this responsibility. a
The other twin goal of the intermediate appellate court is "to
develop the law for general application in the legal system."a 4 As
stated by the Supreme Court Committee, an intermediate appellate
court has the important function, "to foster, develop and contribute
to the law through its judicial decisions." 3 It is, of course, true that
an intermediate court of review functions in a subordinate capacity to
that of the highest court and its contribution to the decisional law of
the state must occur "within the doctrinal framework fashioned by the
highest court."36 That the intermediate appeals court in fact becomes the court of last resort in the overwhelming majority of cases
which go beyond the trial level, however, underscores the significance of its role in developing and fashioning the law of its jurisdiction. Also, the intermediate appellate court deals with many cases

30 Hopkins, supra note 28, at 464.
31 See note 8 supra.
32 1,1.
33 Many jurisdictions, ever diminishing, still function without an intermediate appeals court.
Hufstedler, ConstitutionalRevision and Appellate Court Decongestants, 44 WASH. L. RESV. 577,
595 & n.43 (1969).
34 ABA Standards, supra note 28, at 4. See also P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSEN.BERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 2-12 (1976); Hufstedler, supra note 33, at 587.
3' Report On Appellate Division Reforms, supra note 17, at 41, 65.
36 ABA Standards, supra note 28, at 4.
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which are hardly routine or insignificant. That court is often confronted with cases presenting important, complex and novel issues
which transcend the interests of the individual litigants. While many
of these appeals may be appropriate for disposition by the highest
court, only a few ever reach that court. 3 7 Hence, the intermediate
appeals court cannot avoid decisions in such cases. And, in deciding
them, the junior court necessarily generates and contributes to the
growth of the body of decisional law governing the society and individuals within its jurisdiction. This role of the court in developing the
law takes on greater significance since most states have strongly established jurisprudential traditions rooted in the common law. In such
jurisdictions, judicial influences strongly shape the law and a large
segment of the law is judge-made. In that frame of reference, the
responsibility of an active intermediate appellate court becomes
38
particularly meaningful.
In addition to the assumptions relating to the overall purposes of
an intermediate appellate court, alluded to in the Committee's Report, there was recognition, if not acceptance, of the idea that appellate tribunals are collegial bodies and their decisions must be a collective effort. 39 It seems to be more or less an axiom with respect to
the structure of appeals courts that they be collective bodies. It is
widely believed that the proper discharge of the judicial review function calls for more than one judge acting jointly in deciding cases and
that such a tribunal should optimally be composed of at least three
40
judges.
The reasons for a judicial triad at the level of the intermediate
appellate court are not self-apparent. History may have had a role in
the evolution of collectivity on the part of courts of review. That history reveals that appellate tribunals under the common law did not
arise from any preconceived notions as to the principles governing
the organization of a proper and effective court system. In some measure their configuration was associated with the rise of monarchical
power and the impetus toward centralization of government. 4 ' Perhaps there was some belief that, even in a judicial system, strength
'7See

text accompanying notes 30-32 supra.

38 Leflar, Appellate Judicial Innovation, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 321 (1974). See also Weintraub,

Judicial Legislation, 81 N.J.L.J. 545 (Oct. 30, 1958).
39 See Report On Appellate Division Reforms, supra note 17, at 41, 65.
40 See ABA Standards, supra note 28, §3.00; Hufstedler, supra note 33.
4' See T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 128-43 (2d ed. 1936); I
W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH L.A\V (7th ed. 1956); C. KINNANE, A FIRST BOOK
ON ANGLO-AMIERICAN LAW 208-86 (2d ed. 1952). See generally F. POLLACK & W. MAITLAND,
THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 115-204 (1895).
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was to be found in numbers. One of the earlier forms of appeal, a
writ of pone, for example, was used to transfer a royal plea from a local
court to the Court of Common Pleas, to be considered by five justices
42
or the tribunal which met around the king himself, the curia regis.
Still, for a very long period of time, an appeal to the "king" for
relief did not embrace an appeal according to the settled principles of
the law. The development of a structured system of appeals appears
to have begun in the 14th Century. This is exemplified in part by the
establishment of the Court of Exchequer Chamber which could call
upon the justices of the common law courts as "assessors" as well as
the barons of the Exchequer to hear errors. 43 Much later, a second
Court of Exchequer Chamber was established in which six justices
were necessary before judgment could be given, once again illustrating the advancing conceptualization of an appeal with collective decisions44 as an integral part of the judicial process.
The evolution of collegial appellate review is at least as much a
product of historical forces as it is of any articulated principle about
the role of lav in society. The judicial appeal as a structured and
regular part of the judicial machinery for the adjudication of disputes
emerged gradually over a long period of time. Only in the early 18th
Century did the concept of an appeal as a matter of course, as opposed to a privilege granted by the crown in each individual case, or
as discretionary with the judges, appear to have taken root,4 5 giving
some support to the belief that the growth of the modern appellate
system is tied in with the rule of law itself. It is of some significance
that the principle of collective decision-making as a component of judicial review was a concomitant in its historical growth. But, despite
the respectability invested by tradition and history, the assumption of
collectivity as an invariable and indispensable element of the judicial
review function is ripe for examination. That inquiry should be in
terms of the role and objectives of the intermediate appellate court in
the judicial system.
Unquestionably, as a general proposition, there is a genuine
need for collective decisions at the intermediate appellate level. It
has been recognized that, insofar as the appellate tribunal serves
merely to review individual cases and to confirm or correct trial re-

42 T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 41, at 345; 3 W. BLACKTSONE, COMMENTARIES 32-41.
43 T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 41, at 147; 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 41, at 41-42; C.
KINNANE, supra note 41, at 450-51.
44 C. KINNANE, supra note 41, at 450-51; T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 41, at 154-55.
45 C. KINNANE, supra note 41, at 450; I W. HOLDS\VORTH, supra note 41, at 215.
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suits, this responsibility is better discharged by more than one judge.
On this level of analysis, however, the notion of what is "better" is a
simple truism: two heads are better than one. There cannot be any
sharp dispute with that tautology. The belief is entirely reasonable
that a single judge sitting in judgment of the work of another judge
(or jury) does not constitute a qualitative advance in the judicial process. 4 6 In that approach, there is no sufficient hedge against the
error that may be made by a judge acting alone and hence the purpose of judicial review as a correcting mechanism is not predictably
fulfilled by a single appellate judge. Moreover, the process of reaching decisions at the appellate level is intensely personal and entails,
to a substantial degree, subjective individual effort. 47 Hence, in a
great many situations the pooled thinking of more than one judge and
the exchange of thought between judges bring about a decisional result, as well as an articulation of reasons, which not only may differ
markedly from that of a single judge but also will represent a qualitatively more distinguished judicial end-product.
If we concentrate upon the role of the intermediate appeals court
in contributing to the growth of the substantive law of the jurisdiction
the need for collegiality is even stronger. The cases which result in
opinions and which become a part of the decisional law of the state,
usually through official publication, peculiarly call for combined interchange of thought. Illustrations of the kind of case which would work
its way into the stream of law may be found in the standards for the
publications of opinions for inclusion in the court reports which constitute the body of state decisional law. In New Jersey these have
been developed by the Committee on Opinions. 4 The standards call
for the publications of an opinion which presents "substantial
[constitutional] questions" or "determines a new and important question of law" or "involves a novel matter" or is "of continuing public
interest and importance." 4 9 It is immediately obvious that collectivitv of effort at the decisional level is vitally important for the generation of opinions worthy of a place in the reported decisional law of
the state. It has been recounted, and it can be verified by any appellate court judge, that the interchange of thinking that comes about in
the decisional process among three or more judges frequently has a
profound effect upon the decision in a given case and the opinion
46 See Hufstedler, supra note 33.
" Hopkins, The Winds of Change: New Styles in the Appellate Process, 3 HOFSTRA L. REV.

649 (1975).
48 See N.J.R.

1:36-2.

49 Standards For Publication of Judicial Opinions (May 2, 1974).
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embracing that decision. 50 The interaction of ideas and analyses with
other judges serves, in ever so many cases, to change, influence,
modify or confirm individual thinking. Minds initially made up are
unlocked. Thoughts tentatively held may be dislodged or
strengthened. Ideas, dimly perceived, may wither under debate or
sharpen with focus. In other words, man), things happen on an intellectual and pragmatic level when judges confer with a view towards
reaching a decision as a court in a particular case. This dynamic is
vital in terms of the role of that court as a maker and exponent of law.
Having said all of this, must there be uncritical acceptance of or
commitment to the notion that all appellate cases must be decided by
at least three judges? It seems that, while the principle of collective
decision-making at the appellate level is generally accepted and a tribunal of at least three judges may be optimum, that triad is by no
means sacrosanct. The Court Rules in New Jersey contemplate that
two judges may constitute a quorum of the Appellate Division 51 and
that the parties may consent to a decision by two rather than three
judges. 52 Man), courts have recognized that three judges for appellate review may be the norm but it is not an absolute 5 3 and, assuredly, it is not an indispensable component of judicial due process
or elemental fairness anymore so than is the right to judicial review
54
itself.
It has also been recognized that there are a great many cases
which really do not demand or deserve the combined contributions of
three or more independent minds. It has been questioned, for example, whether all cases which reach the appellate level require indepth analysis and exhaustive opinions. 55 To suggest that such cases
do not require definitive opinions is to open the possibility that they
do not require the cooperative thinking of three judges in order to
reach the correct result. In New Jersey, by way of illustration, the
Rules of Court, specifically Rule 2:11-3(e), provide for the dispensation of a written opinion in cases where the issues presumably are
50 Botter, The Making of Appellate Decisions and Opinions, N.J.S.B.J. 34-36 (Feb. 1977).
51 N.J.R. 2:13-2(b) (1979).
52 Id.

53 See People v. Gastellano, 79 Cal. App. 3d 844, 145 Cal. Rptr. 204 (Ct. App. 1978);
Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 39 I11.App. 2d. 73, 187 N.E. 2d 425 (App. Ct. 1963); Hoyt
v. Hoyt, 351 S.W. 2d 111 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961); Fountain v. State, 101 S.E. 294 (Ga. Sup. Ct.
1919); Cowan v. Mureb, 37 S.W. 393 (Tenn. Sup. Ct. 1896). Contra, State v. Lloyd A. Fry

Roofing Co., 502 P.2d 253 (Ore. Sup. Ct. 1972).
5 See, e.g., Griffin v. Griffin, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1893).
55 P. GARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 34, at 31-41; Botter, supra
note 50, at 34-36; Hufstedler, supra note 33.
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lacking in nerit. 5 6 Concomitantly, if the court in a given appeal is
not engaged in a decision of precendential value but merely deciding
the correctness of a routine case, plurality of effort may not be necessary or even desirable. 5 7 This is underscored by the reflection that
the overwhelming majority of appeals are "doomed to failure;- in
other words, most appeals will result in simple affirmances. 5 8 Thus,
the palpable differences in the kind of cases coming through the intermediate appellate court-the simple vs. complex, mundane vs.
important, routine vs. novel-very strongly suggest that decisions in
59
appropriate cases could well be rendered by less than three judges.
These thoughts influenced the Supreme Court's Committee on
the Appellate Division to recommend, as its primary reform, the use
of two judges for the disposition of suitably-defined appeals. Its purpose, as mentioned earlier, was several-fold. To increase the productivity of the court as a whole was the paramount goal. 60 It sought as
well to increase the productivity or efficiency of individual judges and
also, in some measure, to provide a means of relief for the judges
from a burdensome and oppressive workload. 6 1 A correlative, if
not immediate goal of this two-judge proposal, was to provide a
mechanisn whereby the intermediate appellate court could continue
to function, and do so more effectively, in the development of the
substantive law through the issuance of well-reasoned and definitive
opinions in meritorious cases. 6 2 Thus, instead of spreading three
judges thin over all cases coming before their court, the savings in
time and effort achieved through the elimination of the third judge in
the disposition of the "two-judge" cases could be reallocated and devoted
to the disposition of the more demanding "three-judge" cases and the
writing of deserving opinions called for by such cases. The theory of
the reform was to increase the productivity and to enhance the quality of judicial performance of the intermediate appellate court.
GAUGING THE SUCCESS OF APPELLATE COURT REFORMS

It is still much too early to gauge the success of the New Jersey
Appellate Division reforms, and particularly the two-judge approach.
56 See also ABA Task Force on Appellate Procedure, EFFICIENCY AND JUSTICE IN APPEALS: METHODS AND SELECTED MATERIALS 107-19 (1977).
57 Botter, supra note 15, at XX.
58 Hopkins, supra note 47, at 650-51; B. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAw 80 (1924).
59 Report
60 ld.
62

id.

On Appellate DivisionI Reforms, supra note 17, at 41, 65.
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Nevertheless, there are indicia that the reforms which were proposed
and implemented for the Appellate Division are meeting with reasonable success.
One measure of the success of these reforms is in terms of the
increased and accelerated disposition of appeals. The statistical breakout of the activity of the Appellate Division for the 1978-1979 term,
when compared to the previous term, demonstrates increased productivity and efficiency.
The Report of the Supreme Court's Committee, as will be recalled,
also recommended that there be revisions of the deficiency practice within the Clerk's office. It proposed that this practice be modified so that fewer cases would be rejected on account of deficiencies,
thereby increasing the flow of perfected cases into the respective
parts of the Appellate Division for final determination. 63 The office
of the Clerk, under the supervision of the Supreme Court's Committee, revised its notices and forms to reflect fewer requirements with
respect to deficiencies; the number of deficiencies for which briefs
would be rejected was reduced from nineteen to seven. These related
only to the most essential aspects of appellate filings, such as the
inclusion of the final judgment or order appealed from, the inclusion
of essential pleadings, legibility and the like. By administrative directive the Clerk was authorized to notify attorneys that briefs would be
rejected for these specific deficiencies, and if such deficiencies were
not corrected within fourteen days, the appeal was subject to automatic dismissal. Upon the rejection of a brief because of a deficiency,
the brief would not be accepted for filing unless a fee were paid to
cover costs in the amount of $50.
In a relatively short period of time the revised deficiency practice has shown results. There seem to be fewer cases stalled in the
Clerk's office due to deficiencies, and more cases are being passed
through to the court; cases rejected because of deficiencies are corrected and "perfected" for final disposition more quickly."
Moreover,
the assessment of an automatic sanction of $50 has been effective in
stimulating prompt compliance. 6 5 Thus, for the court term, 19781979, the Clerk's office received 6,892 new briefs; it reviewed a total

63 Id.

64 Handler, The Appellate Division: A Progress Report, 103 N.J.L.J. 157 (Feb. 22, 1979), as

supplemented by Report of the Status of the Calendars for (Month of August, 1979) Administrative Office of the Courts.
6- Id. Updated statistics disclose that $73,353 was assessed against attorneys in 1,062 cases
under the deficiency practice.
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of 7,030 (including briefs previously filed) under the new deficiency
standards; it rejected 1,117 for deficiencies. More cases, almost 400,
passed through the pipeline to the court, 3,186 cases perfected and
sent on to the court, compared to 2,808 last term. The Clerk had
more ready cases and was able to schedule cases twelve weeks in
advance of the calendared date for disposition in contrast to only
eight weeks in advance of submission to the court in 1977-1978.
Moreover, the number of cases otherwise held up awaiting calendar66
ing was sharply reduced.
The deficiency procedures of the Clerk's office have dovetailed
with the new two-judge practice. As noted, the amended Rule 2:132(b) now provides that all cases in the Appellate Division are to be
decided by two judges except appeals involving questions of public
importance, unusual complexity, precedential value or other "special
reasons." Under this system as currently implemented, the presiding
judge of each part of the Appellate Division makes the initial determination as to whether or not cases submitted to the part require
three-judge disposition under the criteria of the Rule. Appeals are
then assigned by the presiding judge to the judges within his part on
a two-judge or three-judge basis and the Clerk of the Appellate Division is advised of these assignments. On the date calendared for dispostion, whether by oral argument or upon submission, each case is
handled in accordance with its designation as a two-judge or threejudge case.
For the 1978-1979 court term there were calendared a total of
3,186 cases in the Appellate Division (compared to 2,808 for the previous term, 1977). Of these, 2,376, or approximately seventy-four
percent, were designated by the presiding judges as two-judge cases;
810 cases, or approximately twenty-six percent, were categorized as
three-judge cases. 67 Thus, approximately one quarter of the cases in
the Appellate Division were deemed to be cases requiring threejudge disposition.
Improvement can be seen in the productivity and efficiency of
the individual judges. During this period of time the Appellate Division disposed of 3,427 appeals by opinion (compared to 3,032 for the
1977-1978 term). It is noteworthy that the Appellate Division by opinion had disposed of -that is, by final disposition on the meritsalmost 2,400 more cases than it did a year ago. Of the total number
of opinions rendered during the first part of the term, 2,141, more

66
67

Id.
Id.
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than two-thirds, were two-judge dispositions and the balance, 1,076
cases, were decided by three judges. Judges wrote an average of
153.2 opinions per judge this term compared to 141.5 per judge one
year before. It is reasonable to infer that the two-judge disposition of
cases has been a material factor in the increased productivity and
68
efficiency shown thus far in the Appellate Division.
Supplementing this effort, the Clerk's office has followed up with
the automatic dismissals of tardy and deficient appeals as authorized
by the Supreme Court through administrative directive as part of the
deficiency and related procedures. During the term, 2,442 cases were
dismissed. The Clerk on her own motion on behalf of the court dismissed 1,664 of these cases. By way of contrast, in the prior term,
without the Clerk's direct dismissal authority, only 1,654 cases were
dismissed compared to 2,175 (2,442 less 267) this year, an increase of
521 cases. 6 9 This new practice has not only cleared the Appellate
Division docket of stagnant and tardy cases, it has accomplished this
70
without substantial expenditure of judicial time and effort.
Moreover, the Clerk's authority is obviously not being abused since
of the total 2,442 cases originally dismissed only 267 were reinstated
by the court. It is also important to point out that individual appeals
seem to be decided with less delay; the backlog of cases is down.
Thus, as of August 31, there were 31 pending cases, i.e., those presented to the court for final disposition but not yet decided. In contrast, last year there were 49 cases pending undecided at this
time. 71 Additionally, there were no cases awaiting court decision for
more than four months following submission to the court compared to
72
a considerable number of such cases last year at the same time.
In sum, total dispositions in the Appellate Division, by opinion
and dismissal, for the comparable terms were raised from 4,686 in
1977-1978 to 5,602 in 1978-1979-an increase of almost 1,000 cases
in one year. 73 The conclusion is invited that the current reforms
have accounted for an improvement in the productivity of the Appellate Division. Undoubtedly, more cases are being disposed of and
they are being disposed of with greater dispatch and efficiency of judicial and clerical effort. The primary factors contributing to this development are the mechanism for two-judge dispositions of cases

68 Id.

71

Id.
Id.
Id.

72

See note 8 supra.

69
70

73 Handler, supra note 64, at 157.
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supplemented by the increased powers and authority vested in the
Clerk of the court to dismiss cases without securing court intervention, to assess automatic penalties under court-prescribed standards
and to accelerate the flow of cases for disposition.
CONCLUSION

The path to reform at the intermediate appellate level has not
been straight and it certainly has not been swift. While the initial
steps were long in coming and the journey, once started, has been
marked with considerable hesitancy, interruptions and several wrong
turns, it has nevertheless brought us to some important way-stations.
These encourage the feeling that we are well on the way and that
progress has been made, that we are embarked in the right direction
and taking a proper course.
We can hope, with some basis, that the reforms thus far undertaken, will result in substantial achievements primarily in terms of
increased output and productivity. Much will have been gained if the
Appellate Division will be able to push its productivity to dispose of
more cases annually, reduce the backlogs, and decide individual cases
more promptly. Students of judicial performance should also be able
to discern, in the future, an enriched quality in the opinions of that
court in important and deserving cases. What is most significant, for
the present, is that a substantial beginning has been made, laying the
foundations for continued efforts toward reform and change designed
to improve the dispensation of justice.

